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Our society has developed a wide range of measuresfor controlling and deterring behaviour that is feltto be undesirable. At one end of the spectrum is
the public expression of disapproval by an authoritative
body – the “naming and shaming” of those who are
thought to have misbehaved. At the other end of the
spectrum is the use of the criminal law – a highly
formalised process, the outcome of which might involve
the imposition of severe penalties or punishment on the
offender. Between the two extremes lie a number of
administrative and regulatory procedures, each of which is
designed to deter or penalise the transgressor.
The argument of this paper is that, in deciding which
procedure is best applied to a particular form of
undesirable behaviour, we should be careful to match the
selected process and its potential outcome to the nature of
the transgression and to the perception of the transgression
held within society at large. In the case of activity in
ﬁnancial markets, we have not done this. In relation to
some kinds of behaviour there is a mismatch between the
legislative response to the behaviour, and the view of that
behaviour generally held in the community. Consequently,
if juries are faced with an offence for which they think the
punishment is inappropriate they may acquit the defendant
even though they have little doubt that the facts alleged by
the prosecution are correct.
CRIME AND REGULATION
Most people would take the view that the purpose of the
criminal law is to enforce modes of behaviour that are
accepted by society as obligatory. Lord Coleridge CJ said of
the criminal law in R v Instan [1893] 1 QB 450:
“… every legal duty is founded on a moral obligation. A
legal common law duty is nothing else than the enforcing by
law of that which is a moral obligation without legal
enforcement.”
The current edition of Archbold puts it more trenchantly
in its very ﬁrst paragraph:
“An indictment lies at common law for a breach of duty which
is not a mere private injury but an outrage on the moral
duties of society”.
However, Parliament has not been as scrupulous as the
common law in restricting criminality to those acts that
imply a moral obligation. As early as the 19th century
Wright J noted in Sherras v De Rutzen [1895] 1 QB 918 that
Parliament sometimes used the criminal law to control:
“… acts which … are not criminal in any real sense, but are
acts which in the public interest are prohibited under a penalty”.
The use by Parliament of the criminal law as a regulatory
tool, divorced from issues of ethics or morality, grew
dramatically during the 20th century and the present
position is summarised by Halsbury as follows:
“A crime is frequently a moral wrong in that it amounts to
conduct which is inimical to the general moral sense of the
community … An act may be made criminal by Parliament
simply because it is criminal, rather than civil, process which
offers the more effective means of controlling the conduct in
question” (Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol 1(1), para 1).
Parliament sometimes chooses the criminal law as the
appropriate process for dealing with matters which are not
“criminal in any real sense” (to use the words of Wright J)
but which it decides should be inhibited or prevented, for
social or political purposes. Unfortunately, there does not
seem to be a reasoned approach by which Parliament
chooses to use the criminal process, rather than
establishing a separate regulatory structure for dealing with
the conduct concerned. One might suspect that the choice
to criminalise an activity is often based on cost: the courts
already exist, and asking them to deal with the regulation
of the conduct in question will involve only a marginal cost
to the taxpayer, while it would be very expensive to set up
a new regulatory structure.
The judiciary has also commented on the factor of cost,
although judges approach the issue from a different
direction. In evidence given to the Macrory Inquiry on
Regulatory Justice (Report published 2006) the Criminal
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Law Sub-Committee of the Council of HM Circuit Judges
said:
“We support the view that a distinction must be drawn between
matters of regulation and criminal offending. There is a
pressing need to avoid expensive court time being taken up with
matters that are better suited to an administrative penalty”.
Parliament sometimes decides to use the criminal courts
for regulatory purposes, rather than incur the expense of
setting up a separate system, while the judges would prefer
Parliament to set up a separate system, rather than waste
their expensive time. Both approaches miss the basic point:
the overriding issue is whether the criminal law is the most
appropriate way of dealing with the problem, not whether
it is the cheapest option.
INSIDER DEALING
In the UK, our failure to see the importance of matching
the process to the offence can be illustrated by examining
the history of the way in which we have treated the offence
of insider dealing.
Insider dealing has been a criminal offence in the UK for
almost three decades. Throughout this period, prosecutors
and regulators have complained about the difﬁculty in
obtaining convictions before the criminal courts. Between
1987 and 1997 only 13 prosecutions led to conviction (see
FSA Enforcement Division – Company Lawyer, vol 28, no 2,
p 43). Frustration at the low conviction rate has been
compounded by the perceived leniency of judges. As one of
the leading textbooks – Brenda Hannigan, Insider Dealing,
2nd ed, p 127 – puts it:
“The difficulty in achieving a change of perception in the past
decade has been compounded by the apparent unwillingness of
the judiciary to treat the offence as seriously as it warrants, so
that even when convictions are obtained they are often
reluctant to use the full range of possible sanctions”.
However, the low conviction rate and the leniency of the
sentencing may not result from a culpable failure on the
part of judges and juries to take the matter seriously. The
explanation may be that the conduct which is sought to be
controlled by the creation of the criminal offence is not
such as to produce the sense of “moral outrage” that
characterises criminal offences “in the real sense.”
Members of the public know that stock markets live on
rumour and gossip and money is made or lost by
participants backing hunches, often because they believe
that their information is better than the information of
other participants. To an outsider, it may not be obvious
that the use of a particular piece of information is criminal
“in the real sense”.
The offence of insider dealing ﬁrst reached the statute
book in Part V Companies Act 1980. The precursor to the
legislation was a White Paper entitled The Conduct of Company
Directors (1977 Cmd 7037). The White Paper was produced
by the Callaghan Government in response to a series of
scandals involving the misconduct of company directors and
advisers. The thrust of the White Paper was the control of
the behaviour of those people, rather than any wish to
regulate a particular form of activity. When dealing with the
use of inside information, the White Paper said:
“Public confidence in directors and others closely associated
with companies requires that such people should not use
inside information to further their own interests. Furthermore,
if they were to do so, they would frequently be in breach of
their obligations to the companies, and would be held to be
taking an unfair advantage of the people with whom they
were dealing.”
The rationale for criminalising insider trading by
directors and advisers is to ensure that those people
properly perform their ﬁduciary duties in order to bolster
public conﬁdence in these people. Only as a secondary
point is it said that their failure to act properly may be said
sometimes to involve them “taking an unfair advantage” of
their trading counterparties.
The original statutory provisions were replaced in 1985
by the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act. Shortly
afterwards, a case came before the courts, in which they
were asked to consider the purpose for which the Act had
been passed. Their decision had the effect of moving the
statutory offence from the “moral outrage” category of
criminal offences to the “controlled activity” category.
The respondent in the case was involved in negotiations
for the purchase of a small listed company. He was one of
several potential buyers who were talking to the company’s
advisers, Kleinwort Benson Limited. Ultimately, the vendors
decided to sell to someone other than the respondent. As a
matter of courtesy, an executive from Kleinwort Benson
phoned him to tell him he had been unsuccessful, shortly
before the successful transaction was announced to the
Stock Exchange. As soon as his conversation ﬁnished, the
respondent telephoned his brokers and bought shares in the
company, expecting that the price would rise as soon as the
announcement was made.
He was prosecuted under the terms of the 1985 Act, on
the basis that he had “obtained” inside information and
had then dealt, contrary to the terms of the Act. The only
point at issue was whether the information in his
possession had been “obtained”. In the Crown Court, he
argued successfully that the word “obtained” involved the
acquisition by means of effort. He had done nothing to
procure that he came into possession of the information. It
had been given to him gratuitously by the company’s
advisers. The trial judge accepted the argument, and the
respondent was acquitted.
The Attorney-General, Sir Patrick Mayhew QC, referred
the matter to the Court of Appeal, and subsequently to the
House of Lords (see A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1988) [1989]
1 AC 97). He made the following submission:20
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“It is submitted that the purpose of the legislation was not
only to provide sanctions against individuals whether or not in
a fiduciary position who breached a duty of confidentiality by
using information not available to the markets as a whole; it
was also to preserve confidence in securities markets and to
maintain their integrity and efficiency. The market has to be
seen to operate fairly and if it is not investors’ confidence will
be seriously undermined.”
The assertion is that one of the purposes of the
legislation was to preserve the sanctity of the free market
and, it was argued, for this reason Parliament had felt that
any act that disturbed that principle, whether or not it
involved moral turpitude, should be punished by the full
sanction of the criminal law.
This is a most unlikely assertion. The Parliament that
framed the 1980 legislation was dominated by Old Labour
members, who did not regard the free market economy
with the same reverence as their successors. The purpose
of the legislation, as made clear by the White Paper, was to
control the behaviour of company directors and advisers. It
sought to criminalise activity motivated by dishonesty and
greed, because such conduct invoked “moral outrage” in
the wider community.
The Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, however,
accepted the Attorney-General’s submissions and decided,
in effect, that the word “obtain” means “has”. Thus, if
anyone has information that he knows to be within the
regulated category (irrespective of the propriety of his own
conduct in bringing that about), he is precluded from
dealing. Subsequent statutory amendments in the Criminal
Justice Act 1993 changed the description of the offence to
make it clear that no impropriety in connection with the
acquisition of the information is required. The mens rea
required is only the knowledge that the information is
“inside information”. Its use may involve no breach of any
private duty. To use the terminology adopted by Lord
Coleridge, there is no longer any moral obligation on
which the legal duty is founded.
The position in the UK contrasts strongly with that in
the United States. The United States courts began to
convict insider dealers decades before their activities were
criminalised in the UK. However, it has always been clear
in the US that the criminal law is invoked because insider
dealing is a species of fraud. It is not merely a procedural
rule required to ensure smooth regulation of a market:
“There is no requirement of equality of information. Instead
liability must arise from a breach of a fiduciary or other duty
or from some misappropriation of information” (US v
Chestman 947 F.2d 551 (2nd Cir) 1991).
The position within the EU is rather more complex. The
Insider Dealing Directive of 1989 (Council Directive
89/592/EEC of November 13, 1989) was implemented in
the UK by Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993. Article
2(1) of the Directive requires Member States to prohibit:
“any person who …. possesses insider information from
taking advantage of that information … by acquiring or
disposing of …”
relevant securities. This seems to follow the line taken in
the UK in A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1988) that the
prohibition bites when a person possesses information,
and that the motives and methods that led to the
acquisition are irrelevant. Certainly, that was the view taken
in the UK in framing the implementing provisions of the
Criminal Justice Act.
However, a recent decision of the ECJ in the Georgakis
case (case C-391/04, May 10, 2007) has rejected this
interpretation:
“… the purpose of the prohibition … is to ensure equality
between the contracting parties in stock-market transactions
by preventing one of them who possesses inside information
and who is, therefore, in an advantageous position vis-à-vis
the other investors, from profiting from that information, to
the detriment of the other party who is unaware of it.”
In effect, the ECJ adopted the view that is taken by the
US courts, that insider dealing is a way in which an insider
commits a fraud on his counterparty. The evil at which the
legislation is aimed is not the mere act of disturbing the
integrity of the market. Indeed the court in Georgakis
speciﬁcally rejected the argument that the purpose of the
Directive was to maintain investor conﬁdence in the
market (see para 41 of the judgment).
The Insider Dealing Directive has been repealed by the
Market Abuse Directive (Council Directive 2003/6/EC of
January 28, 2003), which requires Member States to
implement legislation that prohibits insider dealing as part
of the wider prohibition of market abuse.
The position in the UK is confused. On the
implementation of the Market Abuse Directive, it was
decided to leave the criminal law provisions on insider
dealing exactly as they were, and to add a new layer of
regulatory provisions, also dealing with insider dealing, as
required by the Market Abuse Directive. Section 118
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 contains detailed
provisions under which insider dealing is included as a
form of market abuse, regulated by FSA as part of its
administrative function in overseeing the operation of the
ﬁnancial services industry.
There are a number of technical reasons why it is desirable
to give the FSA the ability to police the activity of insider
trading along with other forms of behaviour that might
disrupt the securities markets. The decision to leave the
Criminal Law Act provisions in place, however, means that we
now have two parallel forms of regulation: on the one hand,
a particular type of conduct is regarded as so undesirable that
it is appropriate to regulate it by the criminal law, while
another form of regulation treats the same activity as a matter
which is to be regulated through an administrative process.
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The UK criminal law sanction contained in the Criminal
Justice Act 1993 and implementing the Insider Dealing
Directive must now, following Georgakis, be taken to have as
its purpose the wish to suppress fraud and the cheating of
counterparties. The insider dealing provisions of the
Financial Services and Markets Act, however, implement
the Market Abuse Directive and have a quite different
purpose, even though they are phrased in similar language.
Whatever the reason for the parallel streams of
legislation, there was considerable concern that the
regulatory system established by the Financial Services and
Markets Act would be used as a way of side-stepping the
inconvenient attitudes of the criminal courts.
This fear has turned out to be groundless. At the time
when the structure of the Financial Services and Markets
Act 2000 was under consideration, close thought was given
to the requirements of the process by which regulatory
decisions about market abuse would be reached. It was
concluded that the Human Rights Act 1998 might require
that proceedings under the administrative process should
carry the same safeguards as would be available in criminal
proceedings, given that the potential outcome in terms of
penalties was of the same nature and magnitude as that in
many criminal proceedings.
The response to this concern was to provide in the Act
that the person accused of committing market abuse
should be able to require that the matter be considered by
an independent tribunal, rather than being decided by the
FSA itself. The proceedings of that tribunal, the Financial
Services and Markets Tribunal (FSMT), show that it will
proceed in the way traditionally followed by the courts.
Of particular relevance to insider dealing is its decision of
the FSMT in the Davidson case (Davidson & Tatham v FSA,
decision of the Tribunal May 16, 2006). The crucial point
decided in that case was that, although the standard of
proof required in regulatory proceedings under the
Financial Services and Markets Act was the “civil” standard,
of proof on the balance of probabilities, rather than the
“criminal” standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the
two were in practice likely to be almost indistinguishable.
Where the consequences for the regulated person were as
severe as they would be in criminal proceedings, the level of
proof required to tip the balance of probabilities would in
effect be as great as that required by the criminal standard.
The way in which insider dealing is prosecuted and
penalised is far from satisfactory. It is possible to summarise
its history as follows:
1. Insider dealing began life as a criminal offence, the
purpose of which was to prevent or punish the dishonesty
and breach of duty of those in privileged positions.
2. In 1989 the courts redeﬁned the purpose behind the
Act to say that its purpose was, in part at least, to ensure
the smooth working of securities markets, rather than
controlling only behaviour that was criminal “in the real
sense”.
3. Whether or not as a consequence of this change of ofﬁcial
view, juries and judges have not, it seems, felt “moral
outrage” when faced with the offence, and accordingly
have been reluctant to convict, or to punish heavily.
4. In the Financial Services and Markets Act, the FSA was
given power to deal with the matter by way of regulatory
punishment. Whether or not this was structured as a
deliberate attempt to avoid the perceived difﬁculties in
obtaining convictions under the criminal law, it was
assumed that this would be the result.
5. In practice, the terms of the Human Rights Act and the
approach of the Financial Services and Markets
Tribunal have meant that the processes under the
regulatory regime are very similar to those that would
apply if the criminal regime were followed.
6. From the point of view of market regulation, the
efﬁciency of the controls has not improved.
CONCLUSIONS
The history of the offence of insider dealing is an
illustration of a wider problem that we have created for
ourselves. We have not drawn a distinction between those
kinds of behaviour that invoke “moral outrage”, and those
that call for a form of administrative control. As a result,
our ability to control undesirable market conduct has been
inhibited because we have chosen to treat it as criminal. We
have found that the invocation of the criminal law has also
called up the traditional safeguards, both in terms of
procedures and in terms of judicial attitudes, that defend
the citizen against the erroneous application of the
criminal law. The unfortunate consequence is that insider
dealing and other anti-social ﬁnancial behaviour remains
frustratingly difﬁcult to inhibit and control.
The answer is not to shy away from using the criminal
law in ﬁnancial and commercial matters, but rather to
apply rigorous analysis when deciding how a particular
kind of behaviour should be dealt with. In the case of
insider dealing, the 1980 legislation should have isolated
the factors that prompted the “moral outrage” and
criminalised those, rather than looking only at the
economic result of the behaviour concerned. Instead, we
seem to have identiﬁed a particular outcome from
behaviour that might (or might not) be generally
considered reprehensible and have then made criminal any
activity that results in that outcome. In other words, we
have identiﬁed the symptom rather than the disease.
In future, we should give more thought to the appropriate
response to each perceived evil. In particular, we should not use
the criminal law unless its use resonates with the moral values
of those who will form the juries that try the offence.
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